Quantum-to-the-Home: Achieving Gbits/s Secure Key Rates via Commercial Off-the-Shelf Telecommunication Equipment by Asif, Rameez & Buchanan, William J.
ARTICLE TEMPLATE
Quantum-to-the-Home (QTTH): Achieving Gbits/s Secure Key
Rates via Commercial Off-the-Shelf Telecommunication Equipments
Rameez Asifa,b and William J. Buchanana,b
aCentre for Distributed Computing, Networks, and Security, School of Computing,
Edinburgh Napier University, Edinburgh (EH10 5DT), UK
bThe Cyber Academy, Edinburgh Napier University (EH10 5DT), UK
ARTICLE HISTORY
Compiled June 21, 2017
ABSTRACT
There is current significant interest in Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH) networks, i.e.
end-to-end optical connectivity. Currently, it may be limited due to the presence
of last-mile copper wire connections. However, in near future it is envisaged that
FTTH connections will exist, and a key offering would be the possibility of optical
encryption that can best be implemented using quantum key distribution (QKD).
However, it is very important that the QKD infrastructure is compatible with the
already existing networks for a smooth transition and integration with the classical
data traffic. In this paper, we report the feasibility of using off-the-shelf telecom-
munication components to enable high performance Continuous-Variable Quantum
Key Distribution (CV-QKD) systems that can yield secure key rates in the range of
100 Mbits/s under practical operating conditions. Multilevel phase modulated sig-
nals (m-PSK) are evaluated in-terms of secure key rates and transmission distances.
The traditional receiver is discussed, aided by the phase noise cancellation based
digital signal processing module for detecting the complex quantum signals. Fur-
thermore, we have discussed the compatibility of multiplexers and de-multiplexers
for wavelength division multiplexed quantum-to-the-home (QTTH) network as well
the impact of splitting ratio is analyzed. The results are thoroughly compared with
the commercially available high-cost encryption modules.
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Quantum communications; Cryptography; Encryption; Broadband Networks;
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1. Introduction
The optical broadband world is taking shape and, as it does so, researchers are carefully
designing the networks and proposing the applications it will carry [1, 2]. Next gener-
ation (NG) services such as cloud computing, 3D high definition television (HDTV),
machine-to-machine (M2M) communication and Internet-of-things (IoT) require un-
precedented optical channel bandwidths. High speed global traffic is increasing at a rate
of 30-40% every year [3]. For this very reason, the M2M/IoT applications will not only
benefit from fiber-optic broadband, they will require it. Both, M2M/IoT are using the
Internet to transpose the physical world onto the networked one. Bandwidth-hungry
applications are driving adoption of fiber-based last-mile connections and raising the
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Table 1. Overview of recent CV-QKD demonstrations
Sr # Reference Protocol
Receiver
Bandwidth
Repetition
Rate
Transmission
Distance
Secure Key
Rates
1
J. Lodewyck et al.
(2005)
Gaussian 10 MHz 1 MHz 55 km
Raw key rate up-to
1 Mbits/s
2
B. Qi et al.
(2007)
Gaussian 1 MHz 100 kHz 5 km 30 kbits/s
3
Y. Shen et al.
(2010)
Four-State 100 MHz 10 MHz 50 km 46.8 kbits/s
4
W. Xu-Yang et al.
(2013)
Four-State N/A 500 kHz 32 km 1 kbits/s
5
P. Jouguet et al.
(2013)
Gaussian N/A 1 MHz 80.5 km 0.7 kbits/s
6
S. Kleis et al.
(2015)
Four-State 350 MHz 40 MHz 110 km 40 kbits/s
7
R. Kumar et al.
(2015)
Gaussian +
Classical
10 MHz 1 MHz 75 km 0.49 kbits/s
8
D. Huang et al.
(2016)
Gaussian 5 MHz 2 MHz 100 km 500 bits/s
9
S. Kleis al.
(2016)
Four-State 350 MHz 50 MHz 100 km 40 kbits/s
10
Z. Qu et al.
(2016)
Four-State 23 GHz 2 GHz back-to-back ≥12 Mbits/s
challenge of moving access-network capacity to the next level, 1-10 Gbits/s data traffic
to the home, i.e. Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH) [4]. The researchers believe that FTTH is
the key to develop a sustainable future, as it is now widely acknowledged that it is the
only future-proof technology, when it comes to bandwidth capacity, speed, reliability,
security and scalability.
With more and more people using IoT devices and applications, data security is the
area of endeavor, concerned with safeguarding the connected devices and networks
in the IoT. Encryption is the key element of data security in NG networks. It pro-
vides physical layer of protection that shields confidential information from exposure
to the external attacks. The most secure and widely used methods to protect the con-
fidentiality and integrity of data transmission are based on symmetric cryptography.
Much enhanced security is delivered with a mathematically unbreakable form of en-
cryption called a one-time pad [5], whereby data is encrypted using a truly random
key/sequence of the same length as the data being encrypted. In both cases, the main
practical challenge is how to securely share the keys between the concerned parties,
i.e Alice and Bob. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) addresses these challenges by
using quantum properties to exchange secret information, i.e. cryptographic key, which
can then be used to encrypt messages that are being communicated over an insecure
channel.
QKD is a method used to disseminate encryption keys between two distant nodes,
i.e. Alice and Bob. The unconditional security of QKD is based on the intrinsic laws of
quantum mechanics [6, 7]. Practically, any eavesdropper (i.e. commonly known as Eve)
attempting to acquire information between Alice and Bob, will disturb the quantum
state of the encrypted data and thus can be detected by the bona-fide users according
to the non-cloning theorem [8] by monitoring the disturbance in terms of quantum
bit-error ratio (QBER) or excess noise. The quest for long distance and high bit-rate
quantum encrypted transmission using optical fibers [9] has led researchers to investi-
gate a range of methods [10, 11]. Two standard techniques have been implemented for
encrypted transmission over standard single mode fiber (SSMF), i.e. DV-QKD [12, 13]
and CV-QKD [14–16]. DV-QKD protocols, such as BB84 or coherent one-way (COW)
[17], involve the generation and detection of very weak optical signals, ideally at single
2
photon level. A range of successful technologies has been implemented via DV-QKD
protocol but typically these are quite different from the technologies used in classi-
cal communications [18]. CV-QKD protocols have therefore been of interest as these
protocols can make use of conventional telecommunication technologies. Moreover, the
secure key is randomly encoded on the quadrature of the coherent state of a light pulse
[19]. Such an approach has potential advantages because of its capability of attaining
high secure key rate with modest technological resources.
During last few years, there has been growing interest in exploring CV-QKD, as
listed in Table. 1. The key feature of this method is the use of a classical coherent
receiver that can be used for dedicated photon-counting [20]. After transmission, the
quadratures of the received signals are measured using a shot-noise limited balanced
coherent receiver either using the homodyne or heterodyne method. The lack of an
advanced reconciliation technique at low SNR values, limits the transmission distance
of CV-QKD systems to 60 km, which is lower than for DV-QKD systems [21]. The
secure key rate of CV-QKD is limited by the bandwidth of the balanced homodyne
detector (BHD) and the performance of reconciliation schemes, which is degraded by
the excess noise observed at high data-rates [22].
In this article we present the initial results, based on numerical analysis, to charac-
terize and evaluate the distribution of secure data to the subscribers by implementing
the Quantum-to-the-Home (QTTH) concept. We have systematically evaluated the
performance of using: (a) phase encoded data, i.e. m-PSK (where m=2, 4, 8, 16 ....) to
generate quantum keys and (b) limits of using a high-speed BHD, in-terms of electronic
and shot noise for commercially available coherent receiver to detect the CV-QKD sig-
nals. Furthermore, the transceivers, noise equivalent power (NEP) contributions from
analogue-to-digital converter (ADC) and transimpedance amplifier (TIA) are modeled
according to the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipments. Both single channel and
especially wavelength division multiplexed (WDM) transmissions are investigated. We
have also implemented: (a) local local oscillator (LLO) concept to avoid possible eaves-
dropping on the reference signal and (b) a phase noise cancellation (PNC) module for
off-line digital signal processing of the received signals. Moreover, we have depicted the
trade-off between the secure key rates achieved and the split-ratio of the access net-
work considering the hybrid classical-quantum traffic. These detailed results will help
the people from academics and industry to implement the QTTH concept in real-time
networks. Furthermore, the designed system is energy efficient and cost effective.
 
Figure 1. Schematic of the m-PSK based quantum transmitter (Alice) and quantum receiver (Bob) for QTTH
applications.
3
 Figure 2. Schematic of the digital signal processing (phase noise cancellation) module for quantum receiver
(Bob).
2. Characterization of Alice and Bob for Coherent Transmission
The schematic of the proposed simplified QTTH network with m-PSK based quan-
tum transmitter (Alice) and LLO based coherent receiver (Bob) is depicted in Fig.
1. At Alice, a narrow line-width laser is used at the wavelength of 1550 nm having
a line-width of ≤ 5 kHz allowing it to maintain low phase noise characteristics. A
pseudo-random binary sequence (PRBS) of length 231-1 is encoded for single channel
transmission and delay de-correlated copies are generated for the WDM transmission.
Furthermore, we perform pulse shaping at the transmitter according to the Nyquist
criterion to generate Inter-symbol Interference (ISI) free signals. Resultant 1 GBaud
4-PSK (four state phase-shift keying) signal is generated after the radio frequency
(RF) signals are modulated via an electro-optical I/Q modulator, where RF frequency
is kept at 2 GHz. The complete mathematical model of CV-QKD protocol is explained
in ‘Appendix A’. The modulation variance is modeled with the help of a variable op-
tical attenuator (VOA) just before the quantum channel. We used the standard single
mode fiber (SMF-28) parameters to emulate the quantum channel and losses, i.e.: at-
tenuation (α)=0.2 dB/km, dispersion (β)=16.5 ps/nm.km and non-linear coefficient
(γ)= 1.2 km−1.W−1. As the QKD transmission occurs at a very low power level, so
the impact of optical Kerr effects are considered negligible. The polarization mode dis-
persion (PMD) is considered as ≤0.2 ps/√km that enables more realistic simulations,
i.e. comparative to the real-world installed fiber networks.
For implementing the coherent receiver, a COTS equipment has been modeled. The
receiver module (Bob) consists of a 90o optical hybrid, a high optical power handling
balanced photo-diodes with 20 GHz bandwidth. The responsivity, gain of TIA and
noise equivalent power (NEP) of the receiver at 1550 nm is 0.8 A/W, 4 K.V/W and
22 pW/
√
Hz, respectively. For our analysis, we have kept the high power, narrow line-
width local oscillator at the receiver, i.e. integral part of Bob in-order to avoid any
eavesdropping on the reference signal. That is why it is termed as local local oscillator
(LLO). The LLO photon level is considered as 1×108 photon per pulse. A classical
phase noise cancellation (PNC) based digital signal processing (DSP) is implemented
to minimize the excess noise as shown in Fig. 2(c). The PNC stage has two square
operators for in-phase and quadrature operators, one addition operator and a digital
DC cancellation block assisted by a down-converter. The detailed implementation of
the PNC module is explained in ‘Appendix B’ [23]. The coherent receiver requires a
specific signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) to detect the m-PSK signal.
As first step, we quantified the coherent receiver to detect the m-PSK signals as we
know that specific modulation formats require a particular optical signal to noise ratio
(OSNR) in-order to be be detected at bit-error rate (BER) threshold. After modulat-
ing the 4-PSK and 8-PSK signals, back-to-back signals are detected at the coherent
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Figure 3. Performance comparison of classical data transmission: (a) averaged SNR w.r.t m-PSK signals at
different FEC levels and (b) SNR penalty w.r.t ADC resolution for different baud-rates for m-PSK signals.
receiver and normalized signal to noise ratio (Eb/N0, the energy per bit to noise power
spectral density ratio) is plotted against BER. The results are plotted in Fig. 3(a). The
BER threshold is set to be 3.8×10−3 (Q-factor of ' 8.6 dB), corresponding to a 7%
overhead, i.e. hard-decision forward error correction (HD-FEC). While soft-decision
FEC (SD-FEC) level of BER 2.1×10−2 (Q-factor of ' 6.6 dB) can also be used corre-
sponding to 20% overheard. From the results, we can depict that minimum of 10 dB
and 6 dB Eb/N0 values is required for the 8-PSK and 4-PSK signals at HD-FEC. While
this limit can further be reduced to smaller values but at the cost of 20% overheard
in data rates, i.e. SD-FEC. We also investigated the ADC requirements to detect the
m-PSK signals. The results are plotted in Fig. 3(b). The ADC resolution (bits) is in-
vestigated w.r.t the SNR penalty for 1- and 4 GBaud m-PSK signals. From the results,
it is clear that 6-8 bit ADC can be used to detect the m-PSK signals at different baud
rates while keeping the SNR penalty ≤ 1 dB. It is worth mentioning here that high
resolution ADC can give you better performance but on the other hand they have high
electronic noise that is not beneficial for high secure key rates in terms of QTTH. We
have also summarized the ADC requirements [24] in terms of ADC bandwidth and
ADC sampling rate (Ts2 ), as listed in Table. 2.
Table 2. Summary of the ADC minimum requirements to process the m-PSK signals
Sr # Modulation ADC Bandwidth ADC Sampling Rate (Ts/2)
1 4-PSK (4 Gbaud) 4 GHz 8 GS/s
2 8-PSK (4 Gbaud) 4 GHz 8 GS/s
3 8-PSK (2.66 Gbaud) 2.66 GHz 5.33 GS/s
3. Results and Discussions
3.1. Point-to-Point QKD Network
Since the noise equivalent power (NEP) determines electronic noise of the detection
system, it is essential to select a TIA and ADC with lower NEP in order to achieve a
low electronic noise to shot noise ratio (ESR). In addition, as the NEP of the TIA is
amplified by the TIA itself, it dominates the total electronic noise. However, the ESR
negligibly changes as the bandwidth of the detector is increased. This is because both
electronic and shot noise variances linearly increases with bandwidth, so it is beneficial
to use the receivers having 1-20 GHz bandwidth. Since, 20 GHz receivers are easily
commercially available so we have modeled them for our analysis. Furthermore, the
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Figure 4. Calculated QKD secure key rates as a function of transmission distance for: (a) 4-PSK and 8-PSK
modulation and (b) single channel (1-Ch) 4-PSK modulation, 12 channel WDM 4-PSK modulation with 25 and
50 GHz channel spacing. Simulations are performed by assuming 60% detector efficiency and 95% reconciliation
efficiency.
quantum link comprises of the standard SMF and VOA to model the channel loss.
Meanwhile, the variance of the excess noise is mainly due to the bias fluctuation of
the I/Q modulator and timing jitter of the Bob, i.e. receiver modules. It is estimated
that the excess noise can be limited to be as small as 0.01 [25] below the zero key rate
threshold. After optimizing the transmission model: (a) the corresponding power is ≈
-70 dBm (approximately 7.8×106 photons per pulse) [26], (b) the detector efficiency
is 60% and (c) reconciliation efficiency is 95%.
Based on the above mentioned values, we extended our studies to calculate the
secure key rates (SKR) at different transmission distances, i.e. transmittance values.
We have kept the input power constant for every iteration. Furthermore, SKR for both
the 4-PSK and 8-PSK modulation formats under collective attack [22] are depicted in
Fig. 4(a). The maximum of 100 Mbits/s SKR can be achieved with this configuration
by employing COTS modules for transmittance (T) =1 for 4-PSK modulation. While
SKR of ≈ 25 Mbits/s and 1 Mbit/s at T=0.8 and 0.6, respectively. From the graph
it can also be concluded that the maximum transmission range for CV-QKD based
network is 60 km. Hence it is recommended that this QKD protocol can efficiently
be used for access network, i.e. QTTH. We have also investigated the performance of
8-PSK modulation and the results are plotted in Fig. 4(a). We have seen degradation
in the transmission performance as compared to 4-PSK modulation and this is due to
the PNC algorithm that is implemented to process the received quantum signal. This
concept of generating seamless quantum keys can further be enhanced for wavelength
division multiplexed (WDM) networks that will help to generate high aggregate SKR
via multiplexing the neighboring quantum channels. In this paper, we have multiplexed
12 WDM quantum channels to generate the aggregate SKR with the channel spacing
of 25- and 50 GHz. The WDM-QKD results, based on 4-PSK modulation, are shown
as in Fig. 4(b).
The results depicts that the classical multiplexing techniques can efficiently be used
to multiplex quantum signals without any degradation in the SKR. We have multi-
plexed the signals by using 25- and 50 GHz channel spacing. While aggregate secure
key rate can reach up-to 1.2 Gbits/s for a 12 WDM quantum system at T=1. The
importance of these results are due to the fact that next-generation PON services are
already aiming at Gbits/s data rates, so QKD can match the data rates. The 50 GHz
channel spaced system shows negligible performance degradation as compared to single
channel transmission case. Whereas, the 25 GHz channel spaced system depicts loss
in SKR due to the fact of inter-symbol interference between the neighboring channels.
6
This degradation can be easily be compensated with the help of efficient raised-cosine
filters for pulse shaping at the transmitter. From the results we can also infer that the
quantum signals are compatible with traditional passive optical add drop multiplexers
(OADMs) but the insertion loss from add/drop modules can impact the SKR.
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Figure 5. Performance comparison of CV-QKD vs. DV-QKD for access and metro networks.
A comparison of distance dependent secure key generation rate between CV-QKD
using 20 GHz BHD and state-of-the-art DV-QKD systems based on T12 protocol [27,
28] is shown in Fig. 5. The transmission distance of CV-QKD systems, limited by the
lack of advanced reconciliation techniques at lower SNR, is far lower than for DV-QKD
demonstrations. However, comparison of DV-QKD and CV-QKD shows that CV-QKD
has the potential to offer higher speed secure key transmission within an access network
area (100 m to 50 km). Especially from 0-20 km range, i.e. typical FTTH network,
the SKR generated by using the traditional telecommunication components are 10s of
magnitude higher than that of DV systems.
3.2. QTTH Network
Most of the efforts on the QKD system design and experimental demonstrations are
limited to lab environments and point-to-point transmissions. While actual FTTH
networks have in-line optical devices including but not limited to routers, switches,
passive splitters, add-drop multiplexers, erbium doped fiber amplifiers (EDFA), as
envisioned in Fig. 6(a). This restricts the deployment of QKD networks along with the
 
Figure 6. (a) Deployment of FTTH network with classical optical components, (b) Down-stream and up-
stream quantum access network and (c) Hybrid classical-quantum traffic in access networks.
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Table 3. Summary of the average attenuation (dB) associated with the standard passive optical splitters.
Sr # Split Ratio Average Loss (dB)
1 1×2 3 dB
2 1×4 7.5 dB
3 1×8 11 dB
4 1×16 14.2 dB
5 1×32 17.8 dB
6 1×64 21.1 dB
7 1×128 23.8 dB
classical data channels. However, in this paper we have investigated the compatibility
of optical network components and their impact on the secure key rates. We have
emulated the scenario of a typical quantum access network as shown in Fig. 6(b).
The optical line terminal (OLT) consists of a QKD transmitter, i.e. in this paper
a m-PSK modulated transmitter is modeled. The optical distribution comprises of:
(a) standard single mode fiber of 5 km length and (b) passive optical splitter with
different split ratios. The commercially available splitters have insertion loss that is
listed in Table. 3. The variable splitting ratio is vital for the secure key rates as it will
contribute to the attenuation and excess noise of the system. To test the simulation
model under realistic conditions we have also added 0.15 dB splicing loss for every
connection with the passive optical splitter. The results are depicted in Fig. 7 where
we have plotted the SKR w.r.t the splitting ratio of the system. It can be deduced from
the graph that for a 1×2 splitting ratio the SKR drops down to ≈ 10 Mbits/s per user.
While the SKR of 1 Mbits/s can be achieved with the splitting ratio of 1×4. Moreover,
the classical telecommunication components can be used to design a seamless QTTH
network and for short range transmission as well as for data center applications it can
perform better as compared to the much expensive DV-QKD systems [10].
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Figure 7. Performance comparison of QTTH network with diverse passive split ratios as a function of achieved
secure key rates.
3.3. Hybrid Classical-Quantum Traffic in Access Networks
For the commercial compatibility of quantum signals with the existing optical net-
works, the wavelength and optimum power assignment to the signals are very much
important. Different wavelength assignment [29–31] techniques have been investigated
to avoid possible inter-symbol interference between the classical and quantum signals.
The best possible solution is to place the classical channels at 200 GHz channel spac-
ing [31] in-order to avoid any interference with the weakly powered quantum signals.
Most importantly, we have implemented the concept of LLO, hence local oscillator sig-
8
nal is not generated from transmitter by using 90:10 coupler [18]. So apparently with
LLO and 200 GHz channel spacing, there is no cross-talk among the hybrid classical-
quantum signals in the quantum channel. This is very much ideal for commercially
available telecommunication components in the C-band (1530 to 1565 nm). Further-
more, with 200 GHz channel spacing the classical channels can be encoded up-to 400
Gbit/s line rate with advanced modulation formats, i.e. dual-polarization m-QAM
(m= 16, 32, 64 ....). But all important thing is, high data rate classical channels need
sophisticated high bandwidth receivers that inherently have high electronics noise.
Due to this reason they are not suitable for quantum multiplexed signals as shown in
Fig. 6(c). As we are investigating a 20 GHz coherent receiver, so we have kept the data
rate at 2.5 Gbit/s/polarization of quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK) signals for
classical data. The power of the classical data channels are optimized below -15 dBm.
The quantum channel loss in this analysis corresponds to the 20 km of the optical
fiber. The results for quantum signals at diverse wavelengths are depicted in Fig. 8.
The wavelength windows that are not occupied with the quantum channels are used
for classical data transmission of QPSK signals. These signals are efficiently detected
below the HD-FEC level. While the SKR of the quantum signals are ≈ 10 Mbits/s.
We can conclude from the results the compatibility of quantum signals with the clas-
sical telecommunication components. Furthermore, L-band (1565-1625 nm, extended
DWDM band) can also be used to generate the hybrid classical-quantum signals as
broadband lasers are readily available commercially.
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Figure 8. Optimum system performance and wavelength assignment for hybrid classical-quantum traffic in
an access network.
4. Conclusion
To summarize, we have theoretically established a QTTH transmission model to esti-
mate the potential of using the commercially available modules to generate the quan-
tum keys. From the results, we can depict that CV-QKD protocol is beneficial for
short range transmission distances and it is concluded that 100 Mbits/s SKR can be
achieved for T=1. While for FTTH networks, 25 Mbits/s SKR can be achieved for
T=0.8, i.e. equivalent 10 km of the optical fiber transmission. These key rates are
much higher than the commercially available encrypters based on DV- protocol. The
CV-QKD protocol is compatible with network components like multiplexers and de-
multiplexers. Due to this benefit, we can multiplex several quantum signals together
to transfer aggregate high SKR in the range of 1 Gbits/s. Moreover, the splitting ra-
tio associated with the commercially available optical passive splitters influence the
9
SKR and dramatically abase beyond 1×8 splitting ratio. These results provide a solid
base to enhance the existing telecommunication infrastructure and modules to deliver
end-to-end optical data encryption to the subscribers.
Appendix A
Mathematical Model for CV-QKD Signals
Alice generates random m-PSK symbols that can be optimized from pseudo-random
binary sequence (PRBS) at the transmitter, i.e I(t),Q(t)∈{ − 1,+1}. These random
symbols are up-converted to radio-frequency (RF) domain with corresponding in-phase
and quadrature signals [25], that are denoted by SI(t) and SQ(t). Mathematically these
two components can be expressed as in Eq. 1 and 2.
SI(t) = I(t)cos(ω1t)−Q(t)sin(ω1t) (1)
SQ(t) = I(t)sin(ω1t) +Q(t)cos(ω1t) (2)
Where, ω1 is the RF angular frequency. The output is then used as the input of
I/Q modulator, Mach-Zehnder modulator (MZM). The resultant optical field can be
expressed as in Eq. 3 and further be simplified as in Eq. 4.
E(t) =
{
cos
[
ASI(t) +
pi
2
]
+ jcos
[
ASQ(t) +
pi
2
]}√
Pse
j[ωt+ϕ1(t)] (3)
E(t) '
√
2Pse
j[ωt+ jpi
4
] −A.[I(t) + jQ(t)]
√
2Pse
j[(ω+ω1)t+ϕ1(t)] (4)
Where, A refers to the modulation index; Ps, ω and ϕ1(t) represent the power, an-
gular frequency of the carrier and phase noise. For evaluating the modulation variance
VA of the optical signal, expressed as shot-noise-units (SNUs), the parameter A and
variable optical attenuator (VOA) are modeled. To further simply the mathematical
model, the quantum channel loss is expressed as the attenuation of the optical fiber.
Moreover, channel introduced noise variance is expressed as in Eq. 5.
χline =
1
T
+ − 1 (5)
Where, T is the transmittance (relation between transmission length and atten-
uation i.e. T=1 for back-to-back and T=0.2 for 80 km fiber transmission) and  is
the excess noise. Practically, possible excess noise contributions, expressed as SNUs
[18, 32], may come from the imperfect modulation, laser phase noise, laser line width,
local oscillator fluctuations and coherent detector imbalance [33].
In this paper, we have used the concept of a local local oscillator (LLO). It is a very
vital configuration to keep the laser at the receiver, i.e. Bob’s side, in-order to prevent
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any eavesdropping attempt on the quantum channel to get the reference information
of the incoming signal. The electric field of the LLO can be expressed as in Eq. 6.
ELLO(t) =
√
PLLOe
j[ωLLOt+ϕ2(t)] (6)
Where, PLLO, ωLLO and ϕ2(t) represents the power, angular frequency and phase
noise of the LLO, respectively. The structure of the Bob comprises of a 90o optical
hybrid and two balanced photo-detectors. The coherent receiver has an overall effi-
ciency of η and electrical noise of Vel. Practically, Vel comprises of electrical noise
from trans-impedance amplifiers (TIA) as well as contribution from the analogue-to-
digital converters (ADCs). The receiver added noise variance can be expressed as in
Eq. 7.
χdet =
(2 + 2Vel − η)
η
(7)
Furthermore, the total noise variance of the system, including Alice and Bob, can
be expressed as in Eq. 8.
χsystem =
χline + χdet
T
(8)
Appendix B
Digital Signal Processing (DSP) Module
Conventionally, in-order to detect the weakly powered incoming quantum signals, a
high power local oscillator is required. It is very important to select the local oscillator
with narrow line width, so that the laser fluctuations cannot contribute to the system
excess noise. Furthermore, it will help the coherent receiver to have a low complex dig-
ital signal processing (DSP) module, i.e. phase noise cancellation (PNC) algorithm.
As a prerequisite for PNC module, the photo-currents of the in-phase and quadrature
signals, after the balanced photo-detectors, have to be measured accurately. Mathe-
matically, they can be expressed as in Eq. 9 and 10.
iI(t) ∝
√
2cos
[
(ω − ωLO)t+ ϕ1(t)− ϕ2(t) + pi
4
]
−AI(t)cos[(ω + ω1 − ωLO)t+ ϕ1(t)− ϕ2(t)]
+AI(Q)cos[(ω + ω1 − ωLO)t+ ϕ1(t)− ϕ2(t)] + nI
(9)
iQ(t) ∝
√
2sin
[
(ω − ωLO)t+ ϕ1(t)− ϕ2(t) + pi
4
]
−AI(t)cos[(ω + ω1 − ωLO)t+ ϕ1(t)− ϕ2(t)]
+AI(Q)cos[(ω + ω1 − ωLO)t+ ϕ1(t)− ϕ2(t)] + nQ
(10)
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Where, nI and nQ defines the in-phase and quadrature components of the additive
phase noise, that needs to be compensated. We have implemented the phase noise
cancellation (PNC) algorithm [25]. By combining the squares of the in-phase and
quadrature component of photo-currents, as in Eq. 9 and 10, i.e. i2I(t)+i
2
Q(t), and
canceling the DC component the final result can be expressed as in Eq. 11.
iS(t) ∝ 2
√
2AI(t)cos
(
ω1t− pi
4
)
+ 2
√
2AQ(t)cos
(
ω1t− pi
4
)
+2
√
2
{
nIcos
[
(ω − ωLO)t+ ϕ1(t)− ϕ2(t) + pi
4
]
nQsin
[
(ω − ωLO)t+ ϕ1(t)− ϕ2(t) + pi
4
]} (11)
The final step in the DSP module is to down-convert the RF signal. The resultant
in-phase and quadrature components can be expressed as in Eq. 12 and 13
rI = LPF
[
iS(t)cos
(
ω1t− pi
4
)]
= −
√
2AI + n′I (12)
rQ = LPF
[
iS(t)sin
(
ω1t− pi
4
)]
= −
√
2AQ+ n′Q (13)
Where, n’I and n’Q are the equivalent additive noise that is added during the
transmission and detection processes prior to DSP module. By considering Eq. 12
and 13, it is concluded that the original m-PSK signals can be detected without any
frequency and phase distortions.
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